报告时间：2025年3月24日（星期一）15:40-17:00报告

地点：博学楼2楼东侧 I-206

报告人简介

连暐虹（Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien），山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山东大学特聘教授、国家自然科学基金委外籍优青，山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）联席主任。美国卫尔斯利女子学院学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士。担任North

American Journal of Economics and Finance、Scientific Reports、International

Journal of Finance and Economics等多份国际学术期刊客座编辑与编委成员，担任多所政府科研资助机构评审专家，担任多所高校教师晋升外审专家，担任31种期刊匿名评审人，多次获评杰出评审人。研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American

Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games

and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。曾获“中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖”“中国信息经济学2018青年创新奖”和“中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖”。‍‍

内容摘要The lies of

individuals holding positions of influence in society can result in significant

consequences for the distribution of resources. A relationship between lying

behavior and social preferences has often been proposed in explaining patterns

of lying aversion. However, studies have seldom directly examined the

relationship between different types of social preferences and the

corresponding lying behaviors. We assess individuals’ preferences over social

allocations along with their lying tendencies in the analogous scenarios, using

a novel multinomial version of a ‘mind cheating game’, which allows different

degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns.

Our study allows us to observe how preferences over fairness and efficiency are

associated with the willingness to lie for one’s self and others. Selfish and

spiteful lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the

allocation task, while those subjects with efficiency-oriented preferences tend

to tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, among those with a strong

preference for fairness in allocations with own-payoff consequence, lying on

behalf of fairness concerns is less apparent. Altogether, the empirical

patterns suggest that individuals with a strong preference for efficiency in

such scenarios are more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with a

strong fairness preference may be more likely to lie out of self-interest.

邀请单位：公共管理学院、高等经济研究院

撰稿：姜彦驰  

审核：刘德海、胡蓉